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EMPLOYEE CHALLENGES TO COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
CONTRACTS: THE SCOPE OF JUDICIAL REVIEW*
COLLECTIvE bargaining contracts may confer seemingly greater benefits
upon some employees than others in a bargaining unit. To the extent that
employees have divergent interests or particular skills, contracts necessarily
must affect them differently." However, diversity of treatment may also
result from a union's failure to represent fairly all employees in a unit.2 Yet
so long as a union retains support of a majority of workers in a unit, em.
ployees dissatisfied with the contract cannot bargain directly with the em-
ployer or through another agent; the National Labor Relations Act and the
Railway Labor Act empower the majority representative to bargain ex-
clusively for all workers in the unit.3 The dissatisfied minority, if union
members, may challenge the existing agreement through the union's grievance
procedures 4 or campaign within the union for revision of the contract.5 When
such intra-union remedies fail or are unavailable, the minority's only recourse
is to attack the contract before the administrative agencies or the courts.
* Huffman v. Ford Motor Co., 195 F.2d 170 (6th Cir. 1952), ccrt. granted, 73 Sup. Ct.
35 (1952).
1. See Cox, CASES ON LABOR LAw 891-2 (2d ed. 1951); CAmm.A ', CoLL~cnvw
BARGAINING 140 (1951).
2. See, e.g., Graham v. Brotherhood, 338 U.S. 232 (1949) ; Tunstall v. Brotherhood,
323 U.S. 210 (1944). For discussion of the union's duty to represent fairly minority
groups in the bargaining unit, see Notes, 65 HAv. L. Rxv. 490 (1952) (comprehensive
treatment) ; 52 CoL. L. Rxv. 399 (1952) ; 37 CORNELL L.Q. 509 (1952). See also BAIMu
& KERR, UNIONS, MANAGEMENT AND THE PuBLIC 178-201 (1948).
3. 49 STAT. 453 (1935), 29 U.S.C. § 159(a), as amended, 61 STAT. 143-4 (1947), 29
U.S.C. § 159(a) (Supp. 1952) (NLRA) ; 48 STAT. 1187 (1928), as amended, 45 U.S.C.
§ 152 subd. fourth (1946) (RLA). See J. I. Case Co. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 332 (1944)
(NLRA construed); Order of Railroad Telegraphers v. Railway Express Agency, Inc.,
321 U.S. 342 (1944) (RLA construed).
4. The United Automobile Workers-CIO, for example, affords individual members
a right of appeal up to the floor of the international convention. Communication to the
YALE LAW JOURNAL from Kurt L. Hanslowe, Assistant General Counsel, UAW-CIO,
dated November 6, 1952, in Yale Law Library. The disputed seniority clause in the priln-
cipal case, Huffman v. Ford Motor Co., 195 F2d 170 (6th Cir. 1952), cert. granted,
73 Sup. Ct. 35 (1952), had been challenged unsuccessfully before the international con-
vention. Communication from Kurt L. Hanslowe, supra. The Railway Brotherhoods
permit appeals, with the international president as final arbiter. See Division 525,
Order of Ry. Conductors v. Gorman, 133 F2d 273, 278 (8th Cir. 1943).
5. The union member's participation in the bargaining process, by a right to vote oil
the proposed contract or to select the personnel to do the actual negotiating, may depend
on whether bargaining is on a local or industry-wide basis. See de Vyver, The Intra-
Union Control of Collective Bargaining, 5 LAW & CONTEMP. PRon. 288 (1938); CIAMd-
BnAi LI, CoLLmcrar BARGAINING PRoCEDURES 11-17, 40-8 (1944).
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The National Labor Relations Board and the railway labor boards offer
little protection against unfair union representation. Although the NLRA
and the RLA do not'grant specific power to ensure fair representation, the
NLRB, unlike the railway labor boards, has occasionally attempted to judge
the adequacy of representation." Under Sections 8(a) (3) 7 and 8(b) (2) 8
of the NLRA, as amended by the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947,
the NLRB can prevent employer and union tactics which, in order to in-
fluence union membership, discriminate among employees.0 While the statute
does not proscribe discrimination for other purposes, ° the NLRB has claimed
authority to deal with the problem. Under its power to certify bargaining
agents," the Board has threatened to deny 1 2 or rescind '3 certification of an
agent which fails to represent all members of a unit fairly.1 4 But these threats,
6. Because the railway labor agencies lack the NLRB's power to censure "unfair
labor practices," these agencies cannot use such power to attack a union's discriminatory
representation. Although the National Mediation Board, set up under the RLA, has
authority to certify bargaining agents, the Board has never used this power to ensure
fair representation. See Note, 56 YALE UJ. 731, 737 (1947); Aaron & Komaroff, Statu-
tory Regulation of Internal Union Affairs-I, 44 Ii.. L. RE%. 425, 429-30 (1949). More-
over, the National Railroad Adjustment Board, authorized to bear disputes between em-
ployees and carriers, apparently has no power to hear disputes between employees and
their bargaining representatives. Ibid. See also Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R.R.,
323 U.S. 192, 205-7 (1944) (Adjustment Board provides no administrative remedy for
Negro employees denied fair representation by statutory bargaining representative) ; Tun-
stall v. Brotherhood, 323 U.S. 210, 213-14 (1944) (same).
7. 61 STAT. 140 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 15S(a) (3) (Supp. 1952).
8. 61 STAT. 141 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 15S(b) (2) (Supp. 1952).
9. Wallace Corp. v. NLRB, 323 U.S. 248 (1944) (unfair labor practice for employer
to execute closed-shop agreement with knowledge that union intends to cause former
members of rival union to be discharged by denying them union membership). See Note,
58 HAv. L. REv. 448, 451-5 (1945).
10. For an ingenious, although somewhat tortured construction of §§ 8(b) (3) and
9(a) of the NLRA that would permit the NLRB to deal with all discriminatory col-
lective bargaining agreements, see Note, 65 -Lrm. L. Rrv. 490, 494 n.46 (1952).
11. 61 STAT. 143 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 159 (Supp. 1952).
12. See Larus & Bro. Co., 62 N.L.R.B. 1075, 1035 (1945).
13. See, e.g., Veneer Products, Inc., 81 N.L.R.B. 49Z 494 (1949) ; Larus & Bro. Co.,
62 N.L.R.B. 1075, 1085 (1945) ; Carter Mlfg. Co., 59 N.LI.B. 804, 805 (1944).
14. Exclusion of Negroes from a union often accompanies unfair representation. See,
e.g., Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R., 323 U.S. 192 (1944). And see Aaron & Kom-
aroff, Statutory Regulation of Internl Union Affairs-I, 44 IL. L Rv. 425, 435 (1949).
But the NLRB has ruled that such exclusion does not constitute a sufficient basis for
denying certification. E.g., Atlanta Oak Flooring Co., 62 N.L.B. 973 (1945). In Larus
& Bro. Co., 62 N.L.R.B. 1075 (1945), the Board found unfair representation, but the
question of rescinding certification became moot by the expiration of the contract and
the union's relinquishment of certification.
The Board's certification power, however, was never intended to be a method of
policing the adequacy of representation. Cushman, The Duration of Certification by the
National Labor Relations Board and the Doctrine of Administrative Stability, 45 Micrs.
L. REv. 1, 33-5 (1946).
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never carried out,15 have been made only in cases where the union allegedly
discriminated against Negroes. 16 And even if certification were denied in
these cases, the majority representative could continue to bargain for the unit
with the employer.17
To challenge discriminatory contract clauses, therefore, employees must
look to the courts. After exhausting any administrative 18 and intra-union
remedies they might have, 9 employees may sue the employer and union to
enjoin performance of the disputed contract 20 and to recover damages for
past injuries.21 Courts traditionally have denied relief on the theory that
a union is a private association, immune from judicial interference. 22 Some
courts recently have explained their reluctance to upset contracts by the desire
to avoid impinging on the freedom of collective bargaining.23 A few cases
suggest that a union owes its members the duty to act in "good faith"2 4 and
15. The Board came closest to exercising this power in Larus & Bro. Co., 62
N.L.R.B. 1075 (1945). See note 14 supra.
16. See cases cited in note 13 supra.
17. "[I]t is well established that whenever a representative had been designated by
a majority of the employees in an appropriate unit, the employer is under an immediate
duty to bargain collectively and may not insist that the designated union procure a certi-
fication from the Board." Cox, CASES ON LABOR LAw 492 (2d ed. 1951).
18. Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R.R., 323 U.S. 192, 207 (1944). In most cases
it is doubtful if an administrative remedy exists. See preceding paragraph in text.
19. See Haynes v. United Chemical Workers, 190 Tenn. 165, 174, 228 S.W.2d 101,
105 (1950). See also Vorenberg, Exhatstion of Intra-union Renedies, 2 LAn. L.J. 487
(1951); Note, 44 YALE L.J. 1446 (1935).
20. See. cases cited in note 31 infra.
21. See Brotherhood v. Tunstall, 163 F.2d 289, 293 "(4th Cir. 1947) (operation of
contract enjoined and damages recovered from union) ; Rolax v. Atlantic C.L.ILR. 186 F.2d
473, 480 (4th Cir. 1951) (damages recovered from both union and employer).
22. E.g., Teague v. Brotherhood, 127 F.2d 53, 56 (6th Cir. 1942) (refusal to enjoin
provisions of collective bargaining agreement discriminating on the basis of race) ; Cou-
rant v. Int'l Photographers, 176 F.2d 1000, 1003 (9th Cir. 1949) (refusal to interfere with
union's admissions policy); Shaup v. Grand Int'l Bro., 223 Ala. 202, 204-05, 135 So.
327, 328-9 (1931) (refusal to interfere with union's determination of employee's seniority
status); Long v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R., 155 Md. 265, 279-80, 141 At. 504, 509 (1928)
(same); Jennings v. Jennings, 56 Ohio Law Abstract, 258, 260-1, 91 N.E.2d 899, 900-01
(Ct. App. Mahoning County 1949) (refusal to invalidate allegedly unfair distribution of
back wage fund). But cf. Local Union No. 57 v. Boyd, 245 Ala. 227, 16 So,2d 705
(1944) (arbitrary expulsion from union resulting in loss of job prohibited because worker
has "vested proparty right" in job) ; Fleming v. Motion Picture Operators, 124 N.J. Eq,
269, 1 A.2d 386 (1938) (same). See Note, 52 COL. L. Rav. 399, 400-01 (1952). See also
Hewitt, The Right to Membership in a Labor Union, 99 U. oF PA. L. REv. 919, 928-36
(1951).
23. Jennings v. Jennings, 56 Ohio Law Abstract 258, 263, 91 N.E.2d 899, 902 (Ct,
App. Mahoning County 1949) (refusal to invalidate allegedly unfair distribution of back
wage fund); Hess v. Trailer Co. of America, 31 Ohio Op. 566, 569-70 (C.P. 19-14)
(refusal to enjoin operation of disputed seniority provision).
24. E.g., Piercy v. Louisville & Nashville R.R., 198 Ky. 477, 248 S.W. 1042 (1923),
See Comment, 47 YALE L.J. 73, 90 (1937) ; Christenson, Seniority Rights under Labor
Union Working Agreements, 11 TEmp. L.Q. 355, 370-1 (1937).
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"in accordance with its constitution."2  But the latter requirement is hardly
a bar to unfair representation of minority factions since the majority can
enforce its will in accordance with procedural requirements of the constitution.
And "good faith" seems to preclude a union only from interfering vith a
worker's rights under an existing contract. -"3 In the landmark Steele case,-
however, the Supreme Court imposed on bargaining agents under the RLA
the duty to represent fairly all members of a craft.2 The Court inferred this
duty from provisions of the Act that make a union, supported by a majority
of employees in a craft, the exclusive bargaining agent for the entire unit.P
In the absence of such a duty, minority groups might be denied representa-
tion.3 The Court found in Steele that the defendant union had violated this
duty by making a contract which discriminated against Negro workers. Sub-
sequent cases which invalidated contract clauses were confined to similar
25. E.g., Gleason v. Thomas, 117 IV. Va. 550, 1S6 S.E. 304 (1936).
26. In Belanger v. Local Division, 254 NVis. 344, 36 NAV.2d 414 (1949), employer
and union altered the contract's seniority clause. The court viewed this as an amendment
to a valid existing contract; the change was thus unlawful. When the contract expired,
the parties incorporated the previously invalid provision in the new agreement This was
upheld. Belanger v. Local Division, 256 Wis. 479, 41 NV.2d 607 (1950). See also Day
v. Louisville & Nashville RR., 295 Ky. 679, 175 S.,V2d 347 (1943).
27. Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R., 323 U.S. 192 (1944).
28. Chief Justice Stone, at one point in the opinion, discussed the duty to represent
"non-union members of the craft." Id. at 201. Yet later, the opinion refers to the duty
to represent all members of the craft. Id. at 202-3. Clearly, the latter phraseology would
include minority factions within the union as well as employees in the bargaining unit
who are not union members. The rationale of the opinion suggests that the Court did
not intend to exclude minority factions within the union from the class to whom the union
owed the duty. See Huffman v. Ford Motor Co., 195 F2d 170 (6th Cir. 1952), ccrt.
granted, 73 Sup. Ct. 35 (1952) (statutory duty owed tt, minrity faction within the union).
Contra: IWilliams v. Yellow Cab Co., 21 U.S.L. WE=z 226 (3d Cir. Dee. 8, 1952) (no
statutory duty owed to minority members of union). In a recent case, Brotherhood
v. Howard, 343 U.S. 768 (1952), a divided Supreme Court held that a union under
the RLA is under a duty to refrain from using its bargaining power to discriminate
racially against members of a different bargaining unit. The Court considered the differ-
ent classification of the units unimportant, perhaps because employees oi both units
were performing the same tasks.
29. Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R.R., 323 U.S. 192, 199-200 (1944). A similar
duty can be inferred from § 9(a) of the NLRA, 61 STAT. 143 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 159(a)
(Supp. 1952), which authorizes a union supported by a majority of the employees in a
bargaining unit to bargain exclusively for all the employces. The NLRB, when threatening
to rescind certification, has cited Steele. See cazes cited in note 13 supra. See Wallace
Corp. v. NLRB, 323 U.S. 248, 255 (1944).
30. "Unless the labor union representing a craft owes some duty to represent non-
union members of the craft, at least to the extent of not discriminating against them as
such in the contracts which it makes as their representative, the minority would be left
with no means of protecting their interests or, indeed, their right to earn a livelihood by
pursuing the occupation in which they are employed." Steele v. Louisville & Nashville
R.R., 323 U.S. 192, 201 (1944j.
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facts. 31 In cases where challenged contract provisions did not involve racial
discrimination, courts consistently have refused to upset the agreement 3"
In Huffman v. Ford Motor Company,3 the union's duty to represent fairly
was invoked for the first time to invalidate a contract making no racial dis-
tinctions. 34 Under the Selective Service Act of 1940, veterans returning to
their pre-war jobs received seniority credit for time spent in military service,
But the Act made no provision for veterans who did not hold jobs before
induction into the armed forces.35 To treat all veterans alike, Ford and the
United Automobile Workers negotiated a contract granting to newly hired
veterans seniority credit for military service.3 0 As a result, certain newly
hired veterans acquired higher seniority than employees with earlier hiring
dates. During subsequent employment slumps, some newly hired veterans
31. Brotherhood v. Howard, 343 U.S. 768 (1952) ; Graham v. Brotherhood, 338 U.S.
232 (1949); Tunstall v. Brotherhood, 323 U.S. 210 (1944); Brotherhood v. Mitchell,
190 F.2d 308 (5th Cir. 1951); Rolax v. Atlantic C.L.R.R., 186 F.2d 473 (4th Cir. 1950).
32. Britt v. Trailmobile Co., 179 F2d 569 (6th Cir. 1950) (seniority provisions dis-
puted following merger of formerly independent bargaining units) ; Hess v. Trailer Co.
of America, 17 Ohio Supp. 39, 31 Ohio Op. 566 (C.P. 1944) (same); Elder v. New York
Cent. R.R., 152 F.2d 361 (6th Cir. 1945) (same); Belanger v. Local Division, 256 Wis.
479, 41 N.W2d 607 (1950) (same); Jennings v. Jennings, 56 Ohio Law Abstract 258,
91 N.E2d 899 (Ct. App. Mahoning County 1949) (contract's distribution of back wage
fund not upset) ; Lewellyn v. Fleming, 154 F2d 211 (10th Cir. 1946) (revision of old
seniority districts); Edelstein v. Duluth, M. & I.R.Ry, 225 Minn. 503, 31 N.W.2d 465
(1948) (same); Hester v. Brotherhood, 99 F. Supp. 968 (W.D. Mo. 1951) (reappor-
tionment of jobs between two bargaining units).
33. 195 F2d 170 (6th Cir. 1952), cert. granted, 73 Sup. Ct. 35 (1952).
34. But cf. Crowell v. Palmer, 134 Conn. 502, 509, 58 A.2d 729, 732 (1948) (Steele
cited by court enjoining an unfair apportionment of overtime work which violates collective
agreement).
35. 54 STAT. 890 (1940), as amended, 50 U.S.C. Aip. § 308(b) (1946). Interpreting
this statute, the Supreme Court said that a veteran "does not step back on the seniority
escalator at the point he stepped off. He steps back on at the precise point he would have
occupied had he held his position continuously during the war." Fishgold v. Sullivan
Drydock & Repair Corp., 328 U.S. 275, 284-5 (1946). The statute gives seniority credit
for time spent in service only to a veteran who "has left or leaves a position" to which he
returns.
36. In addition to reenacting the seniority provisions of the Selective Service Act,
the contract read:
"Any veteran of World War II who was not employed by any person or company at
the time of his entry into the service . . .and who is hired by the company after he is
relieved from training and service ... shall, upon having been employed for six (6)
months ... receive seniority credit for the period of such service subsequent to June 21,
1941, provided:
"Such veteran shall not have previously exercised his right in any plant of this
or any other company."
Brief for Apellees, p. 4, Huffman v. Ford Motor Co., 195 F.2d 170 (6th Cir. 1952).
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continued working while non-veterans and rehired veterans with earlier hiring
dates were laid off. One such rehired veteran sought a declaratory judgment,
against Ford and the union, invalidating the seniority clause in the contract.-T
Plaintiff claimed, among other things, that the contract discriminated against
rehired veterans in favor of veterans not employed by Ford prior to military
service.38 The district court granted defendant's motion for summary judg-
ment.39 On appeal, the Sixth Circuit reversed, holding the clause unenforce-
able as to plaintiff and those veterans "similarly situated. 4 0 The Supreme
Court granted certiorari 41 and already has heard the oral argument. ° The
Court's decision should be handed down shortly.
The Sixth Circuit's holding was grounded on Steele. There the Supreme
Court had said: "Variations in the terms of the contract based on differences
relevant to the authorized purposes of the contract in conditions to which
they are to be applied, such as differences in seniority, the type of work per-
formed, the competence and skill with which it is performed, are within the
scope of the bargaining representation of a craft. . .4., This language,
seemingly incomprehensible, had never been explained by the Supreme Court
or by any lower court. Huff man, however, relied on this portion of the opinion,
interpreting it to mean that contract provisions are void which have "no
relevance to terms and conditions of work or the normal and usual subjects
of contracts between union and employer."-" The court held that, since acts
performed prior to employment were unrelated to "conditions of work," the
disputed seniority clause was invalid.40 But the Huffmnan standard is both
unrealistic and short-sighted. Seniority standing has often been influenced
by such things as the worker's sex, marital status, number of dependents,
37. Plaintiff brought the action individually and on behalf of appro-imately 275 other
employees at Ford's "Louisville Works:' Huffman v. Ford Motor Co., 195 F.2d 170,
171-2 (6th Cir. 1952).
33. Plaintiff also contended that the contract denied him the seniority rights guaran-
teed by the Selective Service Act of 1940. Brief for Appellant, pp. 10-11, Huffman v.
Ford 'Motor Co., 195 F.2d 170 (6th Cir. 1952). See note 35 supra. Neither th
District Court nor the Court of Appeals sustained this contention.
39. Huffman v. Ford Motor Co., W.D. Ky., May 23, 1951.
40. Huffman v. Ford Motor Co., 195 F.2d 170 (6th Cir. 1952).
41. Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 73 Sup. Ct. 35 (19521.
42. 21 U.S.L. WVEx 3174 (U.S. Dec. 23, 1952).
43. Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R.R., 323 U.S. 192, 203 (1944).
44. Huffman v. Ford Motor Co., 195 F.2d 170, 175 (6th Cir. 1952).
45. The court said: "[W]e are cited to no case which approves the creation oi
seniority rights . . . upon the basis of acts done or services rendered prior to entering
upon the employment in which the seniority is claimed." Ibid. But Ford (at p. 2) in its
brief) had referred the court to Haynes v. United Chemical Workers, 1)0 Tenn. 165, 223
S.W.2d 101 (1950). There the Tennessee Supreme Court refused to upset a seniority clawse
giving credit to veterans for part of the time spent in the armed forces prior to their
employment.
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residence, citizenship, and physical handicaps. 46 Since these criteria are not
relevant to "conditions of work," the Huffman test would invalidate seniority
clauses based on them. Moreover, restriction of valid contract clauses to sub-
jects within the "normal and usual" area of union-management negotiations
could freeze the scope of collective bargaining. Had such a rule been in effect
a decade ago, many of the provisions now common in collective agreements
might have been held invalid. 47 In any event, the disputed seniority clause in
Huffman was not unusual-more than 375 collective contracts bad incor-
porated similar provisions.48
Steele suggests that the validity of collective contracts should be tested by
the reasonableness requirement of the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Pro-
tection Clause 49 rather than by the criteria applied in Hufiizan.60 In Stee
the Supreme Court analogized the union's duty to represent fairly all members
of a craft with the duty of a legislature to grant equal protection to all citizens.61
Legislatures are permitted to differentiate among classes of citizens so long
as the classification is reasonable. 52 Similarly, a contract differentiating among
employees should be upheld if it represents a reasonable solution to a labor
problem. 3 There is little doubt that the Huff man seniority clause would stir-
vive such a test. The Sixth Circuit implied that the disputed clause would
be held reasonable by admitting that a statute enacting a similar provision
would be constitutional. r' 4 Aside from this admission, the seniority benefits
46. HARBISON, SENIORITY POLICIES AND PROCEDURES AS DEVELOID THROUGH COL-
LE cVE BARGAINING 38 (1941); P-H, UNION CoNr. SEmy. 1 53,521 (1948). Hartley v,
Brotherhood, 283 Mich. 201, 277 N.W. 885 (1938) (married women denied seniority stand-
ing for furlough purposes by contract), 36 MICH. L. REV. 1395. Cf. Aeronautical Lodge
v. Campbell, 337 U.S. 521 (1949) (superseniority for union officers).
47. For a comprehensive treatment of the expanding scope of collective bargaining,
see Note, 58 YALE L.J. 803 (1949). See also CHAIBERLAIN, THE UNIoN CHALI.ENGE To
MANAGEMENT CONTROL (1948).
48. Communication to the YALE LAW JOURNAL from Kurt L. Hanslowe, Assistant
General Counsel, UAW-CIO, dated November 6, 1952, in Yale Law Library. The UAW-
CIO itself was a party to about 300 of these contracts.
49. U.S. CONsT. AtMx. XIV, § 1.
50. For a discussion of this interpretation of Steele, see Note, 65 HARV. L. Rav. 490
(1952).
51. Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R.R., 323 U.S. 192, 202 (1944).
52. "We call that action reasonable which an informed, intelligent, just-minded,
civilized man could rationally favor." Justice Brandeis in Quaker City Cab Co. v. Penn-
sylvania, 277 U.S. 389, 406 (1928) (dissenting opinion). See Radice v. New York, 204
U.S. 292, 296 (1923) ; Arkansas Natural Gas Co. v. Railroad Comm'n, 261 U.S. 379, 384
(1923). See also, Paulsen, The Persistence of Substantive Due Process in11 the Slates, 34
MINN. L. Rxv. 91, 93 n.10 (1950).
53. See Note, 65 HARv. L. Rav. 490, 495-7 (1952). Also see 66 HARv. L. Rav. 365
(1952).
54. "The question presented is not Whether a legislature could have imposed this
change in seniority provisions through the medium of statute. Enactments granting pref-
erences to veterans both in the securing of employment and in ratings for civil service
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ex\'tended to newly hired veterans were a reasonable solution to problems
fostered by the war. The union feared that newly hired veterans would be
hostile toward organized labor if they could acquire only shaky job tenure
while non-veterans retained wartime earned seniority credit.0 'Moreover,
wartime manpower shortages, compelling many employers to hire women
and elderly employees, led to a deterioration of the quality of the work
force.'; And to some extent, jobs were being held by workers less in need of
remunerative employment than were ex-servicemen.5- The Hieffman seniority
clause would obviously prevent bitterness among newly hired veterans and
retain a younger and more able, though not always as experienced.9 work
force during industrial slowdowns.
But Steele lends itself to an even narrower interpretation than the reason-
ableness test: courts will invalidate only those contracts violative of a
clearly expressed public policy. In Steele the union's deliberate and overt
discrimination against Negro employees clashed with the spirit of the Con-
stitution. Under the Fourteenth and other Amendments, the Supreme Court
has assumed a positive role in combating racial discrimination-in voting
rights, housing, education, and transportation.rO Steele may represent only
another instance of the Court's hostility toward racial discrimination by public
or quasi-public institutions. The factual setting of cases following Steele but-
tresses this public policy interpretation. These cases, although never precisely
articulating the criteria for testing the validity of collective contracts, have in-
emminations have been passed and are constitutional!' Huffman v. Ford Motor Co., 195
F.2d 170, 173-4 (6th Cir. 1952).
55. Many veterans who were unable to find jobs after World War I, while union
members continued worting, became hostile toward organized labor. Though consider-
ably stronger after World War II, the unions allegedly faced a similar problem with
newly hired veterans. Brief for Ford Motor Co., pp. 27-9, Huffman v. Ford Motor Co.,
195 F2d 170 (6th Cir. 1952).
56. See HArrisoN, SENIOrro - PROBLMUS )LIMNG DzmOrnAZATION A;D RECo:wrn-
sioir 13-14 (1944).
57. Communication to the YALE LAw JounRwAIl. from Kurt L Hanslowe, Assistant
General Counsel, UAW-CIO, dated April 18, 1952, in Yale Law Library. Brief for the
Petitioner (UAW), p. 11, UAV-CIO v. Huffman, U.S. Sup. Ct., No. 194, Oct. 1952
Term.
58. The Sixth Circuit assumed that the seniority clause "prefers men without ex-
perience over men with e-perience." Huffman v. Ford Motor Co., 195 F.2d 170, 175 (6th
Cir. 1952). But the clause does not necessarily have this effect. For e.',ample, "A" (re-
employed veteran) is hired on January 1, 1942, enters military service January 1, 1943,
returns to work January 1, 1945. On January 1, 1946, "A" has two years' worl: experi-
ence but four years' seniority credit (under the Selective Service Act). "B" enters mili-
tary service January 1, 1941, and is hired on January 1, 1943. On January 1, 1946, "B"
has three years' work experience. "B" thus has more work experience than "A". Brief
for the Petitioner (UAW), pp. 42-3, UAV-CIO v. Huffman, U.S. Sup. Ct., No. 194,
Oct. 1952 Term.
59. See cases collected in Briggs v. Elliot, 93 F. Supp. 529, 538 (E.D.S.C. 1951)
(dissenting opinion).
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validated only those provisions which discriminated against Negroes.00 More-
over, in Haynes v. United Chemical Workers,1 the Supreme Court of Ten-
nessee, citing Steele, upheld a contract expressly on the ground that it was
in keeping with public policy. In fact, the disputed provision in Haynes was
similar to the Huffman seniority clause. 62 And since the Department of Labor
had recommended contractual seniority for newly hired veterans,0 3 the Hueff-
man clause advanced rather than contravened public policy toward veterans.
The "public policy" interpretation of Steele will minimize judicial interfer-
ence with collective contracts. Dissatisfied minority factions would have little
hope of upsetting a contract unless a clear violation of public policy, as ex-
pressed in constitution or statute, could be proved.0 4 Only those contracts
which discriminate on racial or similar grounds-such as political or religious
beliefs-would arouse judicial antipathy. 5 On the other hand, a reasonable-
ness test would invite courts into the collective bargaining process. The
reasonableness criterion, in cases under the Equal Protection Clause, favors
legislation: a statute is valid "if any state of facts reasonably may be conceived
to justify it."(;( But courts may not feel constrained to extend this presumption
of validity 67 to collective contracts. "Reasonableness" is so flexible a con-
cept that no verbal departure need be made from the test cited in Equal Pro-
tection cases in order to strike down provisions which, to a court, seem un-
fair to minority factions. The commentators who urged a reasonableness test
clearly intended a more affirmative role for the judiciary in the labor field
than courts now assume in constitutional law cases. 8 Specifically, courts were
asked to consider: the difficulty of resolving the problem; alternatives open
to the union; industrial practices adopted in the past to deal with similar
problems; and the result which will best promote sound industrial relations.00
Yet such a scope for court review of collective contracts is out of harmony
with the philosophy of our national labor legislation.
60. See cases cited in notes 31 and 32 supra. Also see Betts & Easly, 161 Kan. 459, 169
P.2d 831 (1946) (union, denying membership to Negroes in craft, enjoined front bargaih-
ing), 57 YALE L.J. 731 (1947).
61. 190 Tenn. 165, 228 S.W.2d 101 (1950).
62. See note 45 supra.
63. U.S. DEPT. OF LABOR, RETRAINING AND REEMPLOYMENT ADaINISTRATION, STATE-
MENT OF EMPLOYMENT PRINCIPLES (1946).
64. See Haynes v. United Chemical Workers, 190 Tenn. 165, 171, 228 S.W.2d. 101,
103-4 (1950).
65. See United Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 10 (1947) (dissenting
opinion).
66. Metropolitan Ins. Co. v. Brownell, 294 U.S. 580, 584 (1935). See note 52 supra.
67. Cf. United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
68. Note, 65 HARv. L. Ray. 490 (1952). For another suggestion that courts take a
more active part in combatting union discriminatory action, see Note, 52 CoL L. REV. 399
(1952) (no attempt to develop criteria for judicial intervention).
69. Note, 65 HABv. L. REv. 490, 496-7 (1952). Also see 66 HAIv. L. Ray. 365 (1952).
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NOTES
The NLRA and the RLA apparently assume that employer and union,
without external interference, can best resolve their mutual problens.70 The
wisdom of this course is clear. Courts particularly are ill equipped to substitute
their "reasonable" solutions to industrial problems for those of employer and
union.71 Judicial intervention could never occur ith full knowledge of the
ve and take-the compromise of competing interests-that is the essence
of any bargaining process.72 Moreover, judicial intervention might disrupt
industrial relations.73 When a court enjoins enforcement of a contract, the
parties must renegotiate, thus presenting the dangers of deadlock and strike.
.And the prospect of disruption in employer-union relations-as well as the
inconvenience and expense to which unions could be subjected-might make
court challenge of bargaining contracts particularly attractive to factions
hostile to the bargaining representative. 4 In short, a "policy" test of collective
contracts can prevent flagrant union discrimination without unduly encroach-
ing on the parties' freedom in the bargaining process.
70. See 49 STAT. 499 (1935), 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1946) (NLRA, Findings and
Policies); 61 STAT. 152 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 171 (Supp. 1952) (Title II, statement of
policy) ; 44 STAT. 582 (1926), 45 U.S.C. § 157 subd. first (1946) (no obligation upon the
carrier and the employee representative to arbitrate). An exception to the general policy
exists in case of strikes imperiling national health or safety; such strikes can be enjoined
for a period of 80 days. 61 STAT. 155 (1947). 29 U.S.C. §§ 176-40 (Supp. 1952). For
criticism of even this exception, see Note, 48 COL. L Rnv. 759, 770-2 (1943).
71. See Schwellenbach, Compidsory Arbitration in BAKE & KErm, Uiio.,s, 3kfA::-
AGxiI A.ND THE PUBLIC 493 (1948) ; Cox, Some Aspects of the La!bor Manageqcit
Relations Act, 1947, 61 HARv. L. REv. 274, 305 (1948) ; Van Arkel, .Administratie La:,
and the Taft-Hartley Act, 27 ORE. L. REv. 171, 173-S (1948) (suggests NLRB, rather
than courts, should cope with problems of breach of collective contracts became of
courts' lack of expertise). Even those clauses which may seem unreasonable may be
justified. See, e.g., Jennings v. Jennings, 56 Ohio Law Abstract 258, 91 N.E2d S99 (Ct.
App. Mahoning County 1949) (court refuses to upset contract), criticized in Note, 65
HAnv. L. REv. 490, 497-8 (1952). In Jennings all employees received equal shares of a
fund, distributed to mitigate past wage inequities. A minority, pointing to their higher
wage rate under new contract provisions, claimed a larger share of the back wage fund
on the ground that they had been most underpaid in the past. But it is quite poasible
that the majority's interests had been sacrificed at the bargaining table to induce the
employer to grant a higher wage rate to the minority and to provide a back vage fund.
How well can a court, forced to judge a contract's reasonableness, evaluate such factors?
72. See CHAmBERLAIx, COLLECr BARGAlINon c.3 (1951); LIE _snuAn, Tnu
Colc=zcnv LABOa AGRMI ENT c.4 (1939).
73. See Britt v. Trailmobile Co., 179 F2d 569, 573 (6th Cir. 1950).
74. See Jenings v. Jennings, 56 Ohio Law Abstract 25S, 263, 91 N.E2d 899, 9t2
(Ct. App. Mlahoning County 1949).
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